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Abstract
Recent literature on the workhorse model of intra-industry trade
has explored heterogeneous cost structures at the firm level. These
approaches have proven to add realism and predictive power. This
paper presents a new and simple heterogeneous-firms specification.
We develop a symmetric two-country intra-industry trade model
where firms are of two different marginal costs types and where fixed
export costs are heterogeneous across firms. This model traces many
of the stylized facts of international trade. However, we find that
with heterogeneous fixed export costs there exists a positive bilateral
tariff that maximizes national and world welfare.
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1 Introduction
Recently, firm-level heterogeneity has been introduced to intra-industry trade
models, e.g. by Schmitt and Yu (2001), Montagna (2001), Jean (2002), Melitz
(2003), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) or Yeaple (2005). These specifi-
cations, where firms are heterogeneous with respect to their cost structures,
have provided important new insights, frequently reconciling theory with the
stylized facts of international trade, see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006),
Greenaway and Kneller (2007), Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007). For
example Schmitt and Yu (2001) resolve the puzzle of scale economies and the
volume of intra-industry trade by introducing firm-level heterogeneous fixed
exporting costs. Montagna (2001) examines trade between countries with ef-
ficiency asymmetries when firms are heterogeneous with respect to marginal
costs. Melitz (2003) features firm-level heterogeneous marginal costs and an-
alyzes intra-industry reallocations, showing that additional gains from trade
stem from the induced productivity improvements.
However, thus far the literature has not fully examined the implications
of these new – and more realistic – assumptions for the welfare effects of trade
policies such as tariffs. Melitz (2003), Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004) and
Baldwin and Forslid (2006), examine the welfare effects of reducing iceberg
and fixed export costs in a Melitz-type (2003) setting with firm-level hetero-
geneous marginal costs. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) model iceberg
cost reductions for heterogeneous firms in a neoclassical trade setting. The
present paper contributes to this literature. In particular, we examine trade
policy by introducing fully redistributed bilateral ad valorem tariffs – in-
stead of the customary iceberg costs – into a simple symmetric two-county
Krugman-type (1980) intra-industry trade model with firm-level heteroge-
neous fixed costs of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu (2001). We find that,
even though free trade welfare exceeds autarky welfare, a positive bilateral
tariff exists that maximizes national and world welfare. Thus small bilateral
tariffs increase welfare. The underlying mechanism is that small tariffs force
fairly inefficient (high fixed export costs) producers to cease their trading
activity. This saving is paired with a volume reduction occurring for all re-
maining traded varieties, due to the tariff driven price increase. In sum, these
effects compensate consumers for the loss in imported varieties, via domestic
entry and larger consumption volumes of home varieties. This effect is at
work, even though we employ assumptions that promote free trade as the
welfare optimum. For example, the firm-specific fixed costs of exporting, i.e.
creating variety via imports, are always lower than the cost of creating a new
domestic variety.
Modelling tariffs explicitly, including the re-distribution of revenues, our
2
paper follows an empirically based criticism of the iceberg costs approach,
e.g. Hummels and Skiba (2004). In terms of welfare results, iceberg costs
specifications may raise additional issues. If one captures trade liberalization
as improvements in the transport technology (reductions in iceberg costs),
such technological improvements should have a positive impact on welfare
irrespective of their trade implications.1 In contrast, modelling tariffs explic-
itly and with full redistribution of revenues, helps to disentangle actual tariff
liberalization effects from transport technology effects, see e.g. Schro¨der
(2004). Moreover, with marginal cost heterogeneity iceberg cost specifica-
tions (e.g. Melitz, 2003) imply that the more productive firms not only are
more productive in terms of producing output, but also in terms of shipping
their output; thus creating a trade bias for these firms.
A second contribution of the present paper is to extend the literature by
combining a simple model of firm-level heterogeneous fixed export costs (i.e.
Schmitt and Yu, 2001; Jørgensen and Schro¨der, 2006) with an element of
marginal cost heterogeneity, where firms can be of two types, and most im-
portantly by introducing an entry mechanism in the manner of Hopenhayn
(1992) and Melitz (2003). In particular, in our model firms make their entry
decisions subject to sunk costs and based on expected profits, knowing only
the distribution of firm heterogeneity in the population but not their own
realization. Arguably, the entry mechanism employed in previous heteroge-
nous fixed export costs models, i.e. Schmitt and Yu (2001) and Jørgensen
and Schro¨der (2006), is problematic, because here firms’ entry decisions are
based on reaching breakeven on their home market operation alone. Accord-
ingly, the examined situation does not depict an equilibrium, since export
profits exist that fail to trigger industry entry.2 Despite being somewhat
simpler than the well-known Melitz (2003) model with marginal costs het-
erogeneity, the fixed costs heterogeneity model of the present paper captures
the central stylized facts of international trade well. For example, within the
model we have partitioning and the export-active firms turn out to be larger
and more productive (lower average costs) than their non-exporting counter-
parts. Also, by allowing for two levels of marginal costs the model can, in
line with Melitz (2003), generate a class of firms that exit immediately after
entry.
The role of fixed export costs – which are at the center of the present
1Put differently, if the world loses only 5 instead of 10 containers for every 1000 con-
tainers that are shipped, surely welfare must increase.
2Despite these shortcomings we find in Jørgensen and Schro¨der (2006), inter alia, that
the possibility of a welfare increase from bilateral tariffs exists. However, only when
modelled under an Meltiz (2003) entry mechanism, as in the present paper, it is possible
to establish that such effect is not simply the result of the un-realized profit opportunities.
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paper – is generally emphasized in the firm-level heterogeneity literature, e.g.
Melitz (2003), Greenaway and Kneller (2007). Fixed export costs or export
market entry costs are associated with items such as administrative burdens,
the adjustments of product designs to local tastes or regulations, information
requirements or the costs of maintaining a distribution network abroad. The
literature on the internationalization of firms provides ample evidence of such
fixed costs of exporting and how such costs vary substantially across firms,
see e.g. Leonidou (1995, 2004), Leonidou and Katsikeas (1996), Roberts
and Tybout (1997), Morgan and Katsikeas (1998), Das, Roberts and Tybout
(2001) and Bugamelli and Infante (2003). For example, Das, Roberts and
Tybout (2001) estimate an empirical model with marginal and fixed export
costs heterogeneity based on panel data for Colombian chemical producers
and conclude that “... sunk [export market entry] costs vary considerably
across plants” (Das, Roberts and Tybout, 2001, p. 23). Bugamelli and
Infante (2003) provide econometric evidence based on a large panel dataset of
Italian manufacturing firms and highlight the costs of collecting information
about foreign markets and consumer tastes as a main entry barrier. They
find substantial differences among firms’ abilities to collect and operationalize
such information.
Finally, the present paper’s emphasis on fixed costs heterogeneity rather
than marginal costs heterogeneity can also be motivated from recent trends
in the organisational theory literature. In the past decades industry struc-
tures for numerous sectors have moved away from traditional integrated firms
– covering the full range of activities in the value chain – to production net-
works, i.e. Fine (1998), Gereffi (1999), Sturgeon (2000, 2002). In such pro-
duction networks an original brand name manufacturer (OBM), also referred
to as “manufacturer without a factory”, specializes exclusively on design and
marketing activities (which are fixed cost activities) while turn-key suppli-
ers, also referred to as full-package suppliers, cover the actual manufacturing
process (marginal cost activities). Empirical studies identify such patterns
for example in the apparel, consumer electronics, or footwear industry; e.g.
Frenkel (2001), Hess and Coe (2006). Furthermore, turn-key suppliers rely
essentially on identical production methods and individual turn-key suppliers
may service several competing OBMs, e.g. Tokatli and Kizilgun (2004). For
such production networks it then makes sense to think about OBM firms to
differ predominantly in their fixed costs, say the power of their brand name,
their ability to penetrate new foreign markets, etc., rather than their mar-
ginal costs. In line with this reasoning marginal cost heterogeneity modelling
as in Melitz (2003) would then reflect sectors dominated by traditional in-
tegrated firms, while heterogeneous fixed cost models – as presented in the
present paper – would relate to situations prevailing in industries featuring
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production networks.
The next section presents the model. In Section 3, we derive the welfare
effect of imposing bilateral ad valorem tariffs. In section 4 we discuss the
results and relate our findings to existing literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The starting point is a standard Krugman-type (1980) model of intra-
industry trade, yet with the feature of firm-level heterogeneous fixed costs
of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu (2001). Consumers in two identical coun-
tries, home and foreign, love variety and have identical preferences, in which
all consumption goods, c, enter symmetrically. Utility is given by
U =
∑
v(ci) (1)
=
∑
cθi , θ ∈ (0, 1) .
More specifically we can write (1) as
U =
Nd∑
id=1
cθd,id +
Nt∑
it=1
cθt,it +
Nf∑
if=1
cθf,if , (2)
where cd,id is consumption of variant id of non-exported domestic products,
ct,it is consumption of variant it of the exported domestic products and cf,if
is consumption of variant if of imported products. The number of variants
actually produced (nd, nt, and nf ) is assumed to be large, although smaller
than Nd, Nt and Nf . Furthermore, denoting foreign variables by
∗, the
symmetry of the setup implies nt = n
∗
f = nf = n
∗
t and that trade is balanced.
Firms
Firms can produce their specific variant for the home market alone or for
both the home and foreign market. The decision to start production and
subsequently start the export activity is firm-endogenous, where some firms
may decide not to start production at all and where not all producing firms
will export. We avoid several of the complexities of modelling the probability
of firm ‘death’ as presented in Melitz (2003), and instead apply an alternative
version, simply envisaging two separate rounds. In particular, production
and sales for the home market (and the fixed production costs α) are sunk
in the sense that they are assumed to occur prior to an exporting round, in
which the individual fixed export costs are revealed and export production
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– if the firm chooses so – and sales take place. Afterwards all firms die with
probability 1.3
Prior to entry firms are uncertain about their marginal cost type and
their firm-specific fixed export costs, yet homogenous with respect to fixed
costs of production and tariffs. Upon entry the marginal cost type (βh,
βl) is revealed while the firm specific export costs (ai) is disclosed after one
round of production for the domestic market has occurred; i.e. this resembles
a situation where firms learn something when servicing their home market
that they can put to use when accessing foreign markets. The fixed cost α,
marginal costs βh, βl, and fixed export costs ai are all expressed in terms
of labor, L, which is the only factor of production and is remunerated at
the economy-wide wage rate w, normalized to 1. Upon entry, but prior to
production firms are revealed their marginal cost type, where βl = φβh and
φ > 1. With probability γ firms are of the high productivity type. For a
large enough φ low productivity firms may choose not to start producing.
The additional firm-specific fixed export cost, ai, is heterogeneous across
firms and, for simplicity, assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, α], with F (.) denoting the distribution function which is public knowledge.
The fixed costs of exporting represent, for example, the cost of building up a
distribution network abroad, the cost of collecting information or additional
costs of adapting a product to foreign specifications or tastes.
To enter, firms face initial sunk fixed entry costs; loosely speaking these
are the costs for participating in the lottery for firm specific marginal cost
and fixed export costs.4 Such sunk entry costs capture costs that are distinct
from the fixed cost of production, α. We operate here with a distinction
into monetary and labour costs of these sunk costs.5 The costs ek > 0
represent e.g. some entry fee or the threshold return (premium) demanded
by entrepreneurs in order to cover the risk they take when establishing a
firm, and are thus expressed in monetary units, and redistributed. The costs
ew > 0 represent actual labour costs and are expressed in terms of labour.
6
To simplify notation we let ew = δf and ek = (1 − δ)f such that from the
entrepreneurs point of view the sunk cost of entry is simply f .
Trade is costly. Apart from firm specific fixed export costs (ai), both
3We are grateful to Marc Melitz for pointing out this short-cut.
4The participation constraint sets an upper limit on the entry costs so that entrepre-
neurs accept to enter the lottery.
5In a general equilibrium setting such a distinction matters. Monetary costs must
be redistributed – as are the tariffs in our model – while labour lottery entry costs do
’vanish’, more in the fashion of an iceberg cost. We hold that entrepreneurial activity
when launching a firm may contain both types of costs.
6In Melitz (2003) all entry costs are of the ew type.
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countries charge the same ad valorem tariff τ ∈ (0, 1) on imports, i.e. a
bilateral tariff. The presence of fixed export costs and the tariff creates an
asymmetry between trading and non-trading firms, and hence, the profit
functions of a pure domestic firm only servicing the home market, and an
exporting home firm servicing both markets, are
pidj = pdjxdj − (α + βjxdj)w (3)
pizj = ptjxtj + (1− τ)pzjxzj − (α+ ai + βj(xtj + xzj))w , (4)
where j = h, l, xdj is the production of a pure domestic firm, and xtj
and xzj are the output of an exporting firm to the home and the for-
eign market respectively. Finally, various market-clearing relations com-
plete the model: goods market clearing Lcdj ,id = xdj ,id , Lctj ,it = xtj ,it
and L∗c∗fj ,if = xtj ,it , where the foreign index if and the home index it
denote one and the same variant; income expenditure clearing Lw + R =
pdhxdhndh + pthxthnth + pfhxfhnfh + pdlxdlndl + ptlxtlntl + pflxflnfl , where R
denotes the net profits of all home firms (which sum to zero in the free entry-
exit equilibrium), the sum of entry costs ek (including firms failing to start
production), and all tariff revenues assumed to be lump-sum redistributed
to consumers; and similar relations for the foreign country. In equilibrium
some firms make profits and others make loses whereby free entry and exit
ensures zero total profit.
Prices and quantities
Maximization of (2) leads to the familiar inverse demand functions of the form
pd =
θcθ−1d
λ
for a non-traded home good id, and similar for traded products
and different marginal cost types. Then, profit maximization of (3) with
respect to xdj and maximization of (4) with respect to xtj and xzj results in
the prices
pdh = pth =
βh
θ
(5)
pdl = ptl =
φβh
θ
(6)
pzh =
pdh
1− τ (7)
pzl =
pdl
1− τ (8)
for products of low and high marginal cost firms on the home and the foreign
market respectively. Since ptj = pdj , consumers do not distinguish between
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non-traded home products and traded home products within a marginal cost
category; and hence, sales quantities of trading firms on their home market
must be identical to that of non-trading firms, i.e. xdj = xtj . Yet, high
marginal cost goods are more expensive than low marginal cost goods and
exported goods are more expensive than domestically produced goods within
each marginal costs category. By symmetry pzj = p
∗
zj
, i.e. the price that
a home firm charges abroad is the same as the price charged by foreign
exporters on our home market. In equilibrium, maximization of utility (2)
requires that the ratio of the marginal utility of an extra consumption unit
equals the price ratio, e.g.
θcθ−1d
θcθ−1f
= pd
p∗z
= 1 − τ . Utilizing the goods market
clearing conditions, this implies within a given marginal cost category
xzj = x
∗
zj
= xdj(1− τ)
1
1−θ . (9)
and across marginal cost categories e.g.
xdl =
(
1
φ
) 1
1−θ
xdh . (10)
Thus within the same marginal cost category exporting firms charge the same
price on their home market and have the same sales volume as non-trading
firms, but charge higher prices with lower sales of their variety on the foreign
market. By the same token, domestic consumers pay more and consume less
of imported product varieties compared to domestically produced varieties.
Similarly across marginal cost categories low marginal cost firms charge lower
prices and have larger sales volumes.
With these relations in place, production scale can be determined as
driven by free entry/exit. Firms know the distribution of ai’s, the values of
γ, α, βh, βl, and the relations given in (9) and (10). Furthermore, there must
exist some cut-off levels, a¯h and a¯l, of the firm specific fixed export costs
denoting the firm that is exactly indifferent between engaging in exports and
being a non-trading firm. Firms determine their entry subject to expected
profits and sunk cost, accordingly in equilibrium some firms will make profits
(those that do export) and some losses (those that only service the home
market).7 Entry of firms occurs until expected profits equal entry cost ew +
7Here, we departs significantly from Schmitt and Yu (2001) and Jørgensen and Schro¨der
(2006). In these previous models of fixed cost heterogeneity firms determine entry subject
to reaching breakeven on their home market operation. This is problematic, because
positive profits from exporting exists in equilibrium that fail to trigger entry. The novelty
of the present fixed cost heterogeneity model is that we overcome this problem, by following
Melitz (2003).
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ek = f . In particular,
piexp = γ[F (a¯h)pizh+((1−F (a¯h))pidh ]+(1−γ)[F (a¯l)pizl+((1−F (a¯l))pidl ] = f .
(11)
Marginal cost heterogeneity can here, as in Melitz (2003), generate the fea-
ture that not all firms that enter the industry will actually launch production.
In particular, we set φ larger than φ¯ such that high marginal cost firms will
exit immediately.8 Given this assumption and inserting (3) and (4) in (11)
while realizing that the expected fixed costs of exporting must be a¯h
2
, the
equation reads:
γ[
a¯h
α
(
pthxth + (1− τ)pzhxzh −
(
α+
a¯h
2
+ βh(xth + xzh)
))
+
(
1− a¯h
α
)
(pdhxdh − (α + βhxdh))] = f . (12)
Inserting the quantity relations (9) and (10) from above (12) can be solved
for xdh to yield:
xdh =
θ
(1− θ)βh
a¯2h + 2
f
γ
α+ 2α2
2(α+ a¯h(1− τ) 11−θ )
, (13)
which is also the home market production scale of exporting firms (xth) and
can be plugged into (9) to determine xzh . Note that in autarky (where the
tariff is the prohibitive τ = 1 and accordingly a¯h = 0), the production scale
reaches the textbook case, namely xdh |autarky = θ(1−θ)βh (α+
f
γ
). Furthermore,
we are now able to investigate the participation constraint of the model. An
upper limit of the participation constraint is given by a hypothetical situation
where all firms break even on the home market and all firms are export active.
This results in expected profits, when participating in the lottery, of αγ
2
and
thus f < αγ
2
. The actual participation constraint, however, will be lower
as additional entry triggered by expected positive profits competes domestic
production scale below breakeven.9
The indifferent firm
With the prices and quantities derived above, it is straightforward to identify
the firm which is indifferent as to becoming an exporting firm or becoming a
8Given the xdh which we derive below, one can calculate the precise requirement φ¯ =(
(2fα+γ(a¯h+2α
2))(a¯l+α(1−τ)
1
θ−1 )
γ(a¯2l+2α
2)(a¯h+α(1−τ)
1
θ−1 )
) 1−θ
θ
, which is greater than 1.
9The actual participation constraint is cumbersome since it depends on various other
parameters, however, since all our subsequent results apply for all f ∈ [0, αγ2 ], they must
also apply for the parameter range defined by the actual participation constraint.
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pure domestic firm. This firm is characterized by a fixed cost of exporting a¯h
such that pizh,a¯h = pidh must hold resulting in the condition (1−τ)pzhxzh−(a¯h+
βhxzh) = 0, i.e. the indifferent firm makes zero profits from the exporting
activity. After setting in pzh , and xzh from above, one can solve:
a¯h =
(√
α2 + 2α(
f
γ
+ α)(1− τ) 21−θ − α
)
(1− τ) 1θ−1 . (14)
All firms i such that ai ∈ [0, a¯h] make non-negative profits from exporting,
while all firms i such that ai ∈]a¯h, α] are non-trading firms. Notice that by
(14) we have a¯h > 0 and that in the free trade situation (τ = 0) we have
a¯h|τ=0 < α. The reason for a¯h|τ=0 < α is as follows. With zero tariffs,
the sales scale on the home and the foreign market respectively are identical
(xdh = xzh). Since exporting promises expected profits, this scale is competed
so small (via entry) that the home sales will not breakeven, accordingly the
exporting activity of a firm with fixed export costs ai = α must also result
in negative profits, hence also with free trade (τ = 0) some firms are non-
trading firms choosing to minimize their losses by refraining from exporting.
Furthermore, a¯h decreases in the tariff rate (see appendix A.1), implying that
the least efficient (high ai) firms will cease their trading activity in response
to a tariff increase. Finally, given the above equations, it is easy to verify that
export-active firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting
counter parts.10
The number of firms
The total number of firms participating in the industry is denoted by m.
However, given that φ > φ¯ only γm will actually start production while
(1 − γ)m exit immediately. A fraction F (a¯h) of all producing firms will
furthermore be export active, such that nth =
a¯h
α
γm while ndh = (1− a¯hα )γm
are pure domestic firms. The number of firms is derived from either the
income expenditure clearing condition or from labour market clearing. In the
former case L+R = pdhxdhndh+pthxthnth+pfhxfhnfh where R = τpzhxzhnth+
ekm; i.e. tariff revenues and the part of the initial entry cost expressed in
monetary units. In the latter case ndh(α + βhxdh) + nth(α +
a¯h
2
+ βhxdh +
10In particular, comparing the average costs of non-trading firms, ACd =
α+ fγ
xdh
+ βh, to
that of the export-indifferent firm, ACz|a¯h =
α+a¯h+
f
γ
xdh+xzh
+βh, one can simplify ACz|a¯h < ACd
to (α+ fγ )
2(1− τ) 41−θ > 0.
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βhxzh) + ewm = L. Solving either conditions for m yields:
m =
L(1− θ)
αγ + f(δ + θ(1− δ)) + a¯2γ
2α
. (15)
Because of trade, consumers also have access to foreign varieties, in particular
due to symmetry nth = n
∗
th
= nfh and accordingly the number of varieties
available on the home market are given by n˜ = ndh + 2nth .
3 Welfare Results
Consumer utility is our measure of welfare. Given goods market clearing and
(2), we can write U = ndh(
xdh
L
)θ+nth(
xth
L
)θ+nfh(
xfh
L
)θ, and setting in values
from above and simplifying gives:
U =
L(1− θ)
α
(√
g (1− τ ) 1θ−1 + α (1− τ ) θθ−1 − α (1− τ ) 1θ−1
)
kθ
f
γ
(1 + δ + θ(1− δ)) + α(2 + (1− τ) 2θ−1 )−√g (1− τ ) 2θ−1
,(16)
where g = α
(
α + 2
(
f
γ
+ α
)
(1− τ) 21−θ
)
,
and k =
θ(
√
g − α)
Lβh(1− θ)(1− τ) 11−θ
.
The following results can be stated.
Proposition 1. Consumer utility under free trade exceeds that under au-
tarky, yet, there exists a strictly positive bilateral tariff, τˆ , that maximizes
total national (and world) consumer utility. In particular, U |τ=0 > U |autarky
and ∂U
∂τ
|τ=0 > 0.
For proof, see appendix A.2. To illustrate proposition 1, consider figure 1
which plots utility (16) normalized by autarky utility U |autarky as a function
of τ for various values of θ, i.e. thus representing the welfare gains from
trade.11 To the right, for τ close to 1, we are in the autarky situation and
accordingly U/(U |autarky) = 1. To the left, for τ = 0, we are in the free
trade situation, and welfare in both countries is clearly above the autarky
level. However, imposing a small bilateral tariff increases welfare until we
reach the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff, τˆ , beyond which welfare starts
to decrease towards the autarky level.
11The expression for U |autarky is given in appendix A.2 equation (A.3). The parameter
values for the plot are α = 3, βh = 0.5, f = 1, L = 1000, γ = 0.9, δ = 0.3
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Figure 1: The welfare effect of bilateral tariffs
4 Discussion
What proposition 1 implies is in fact that there is too much trade in the free
trade situation. National and world welfare increases when imposing small
bilateral tariffs. The welfare maximizing bilateral ad valorem tariff is strictly
positive, less than 1 and increases in the degree of product differentiation, θ,
(love of variety). Accordingly, trade liberalization, in particular the bilateral
reduction of tariffs smaller than τˆ , will be welfare-reducing.
It is important to note that the present model employs several assump-
tions that promote free trade as a welfare optimum, i.e. we have stacked
the deck against our finding: there are no wasteful transport costs and the
firm-specific fixed costs of exporting are always less than the cost of creating
a new variety. Still, we find that in this model there is too much trade in the
free trade equilibrium. More resources are used on the exporting/importing
activity than is welfare-optimal, measured as total consumer utility.
To provide some intuition for the above result, it is useful to break down
the contributing factors. First, examine the number of firms given in (15)
and in particular the number of varieties available on the home market given
by n˜ = n+nf . It turns out that with the imposition of a small bilateral tariff,
the exit of trading firms and therewith the loss of nt and nf is compensated
by the entry of additional pure domestic firms nd, in fact slightly increasing n˜
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at first before it falls for larger tariffs.12 Accordingly, within the consumption
basket foreign products have been replaced with home products. The second
contribution to a utility increase stems from the changes in the output vol-
umes, xd and xz that can be consumed. As can be seen from (13) and (9), a
tariff increases the output volume of domestic varieties available to domes-
tic consumers and reduces the output volume directed at the foreign market
(and hence, the consumption volume of each imported variety).13 Thus even
if the number of available varieties was just constant (and not increasing),
then the pure shift from foreign varieties to home varieties paired with an
increase in the amounts consumed of each home variety would constitute a
utility increase.
To see the logic of these changes in the number of available varieties and
the consumption volumes, consider the following reasoning. A small bilateral
tariff reduces the number of imported varieties and – via the imposed price
increase of foreign products – the import volume of all remaining varieties.
However, overall a small tariff still increases welfare because the least effi-
cient exporters (high ai) are the first to cease their trading activity, exactly
as a result of fixed export costs heterogeneity. Paired with the additional
resources saved by reducing the trading activity of all remaining exporting
firms, enough resources are freed for the production of more home varieties
in larger quantities. That is, the tariff reduces the volume of each remaining
importer/exporter but converts it into additional domestic entry and con-
sumption. However, beyond the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff, τˆ , an
additional increase in the tariff further cuts imported volumes, and more
importantly, it forces fairly efficient exporters out of the trading activity.
Thus, additional variants produced relatively cheaply (i.e. by foreign ex-
porters who have fairly low fixed export costs, ai) are replaced with variants
produced relatively expensively (i.e. by new home producers incurring the
fixed production costs, α).
In line with this reasoning, it turns out that the total fixed costs per
available variety that occur to a country ((γmα + nt
a¯
2
)/n˜) as a function of
τ are U-shaped. Thus a small bilateral tariff, by forcing expensive (high ai)
exporters/importers out reduces the amount of fixed costs that society has
to tie up in order to generate variety.
The finding of welfare-reducing tariff liberalization contradicts much of
the existing literature, see e.g. Markusen and Venables (1988), Fukushima
and Kim (1989), Lockwood and Wong (2000). Also in intra-industry trade
12Formal proof of ∂n˜∂τ |τ=0 > 0 is given in appendix A.3. Appendix A.4 shows a plot of
the number of firms and n˜.
13Appendix A.5 shows a plot of the output volumes xd and xz.
13
models, bilateral tariffs are usually welfare-reducing, e.g. Gros (1987),
Jørgensen and Schro¨der (2005).14 The main difference between the above
models and the present model is that the earlier work assumes firms to be
homogeneous in their cost structure. However, Melitz (2003), Falvey, Green-
away and Yu (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004), all using a Melitz-type
(2003) framework with firm-level heterogeneous marginal costs, examine, in-
ter alia, iceberg trade cost reductions, which are often interpreted to represent
trade liberalization, and find, in line with earlier literature, an overall welfare
gain. Furthermore, Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004) note the
possibility for an anti-variety effect. In contrast to the anti-variety effect in
the present model, this situation only emerges once the fixed costs of export-
ing are larger than the fixed costs of pure domestic production, and thus the
export activity of a firm ties up more resources than would be required for an
additional domestic variety. This case is explicitly ruled out in the present
model.
The possibility of welfare-reducing trade liberalization is, however, found
in Montagna (2001), in a framework where firms have heterogeneous mar-
ginal costs and when comparing the no-trade to free-trade equilibrium, and
in Jørgensen and Schro¨der (2006) for fixed cost heterogeneity. However, both
these papers feature un-used profit opportunities, and thus unrealized entry
in equilibrium, i.e. do not employ the Hopenhayn (1992)-type entry mecha-
nism introduced in the present paper. The welfare-reducing effect found by
Montagna (2001) is different from the present effect, since the reduction in
welfare in Montagna (2001) occurs for the more efficient of two asymmetric
countries when moving from no-trade to free-trade and is contingent on pa-
rameter constellations where trade allows relatively inefficient firms to enter
and when consumers’ taste for variety is low. Furthermore, Jørgensen and
Schro¨der (2006) assume identical marginal costs across firms and full redistri-
bution of sunk entry costs, while the present paper provides analytical results
even though both these assumptions are relaxed. Earlier, Schmitt (1990) has
established welfare-reducing effects of small reciprocal tariff reductions in a
characteristics space model in the tradition of Hotelling. Moreover, in his
model the move from no-trade to free-trade is welfare-improving. Both re-
sults are in line with our present findings. However, apart from being placed
in a different framework, the underlying mechanism is very different. In
Schmitt (1990) the zero tariff situation features excessive product diversity,
a distortion that is counter balanced by the small tariffs.
14On the other hand, small unilateral tariffs may increase welfare (Gros, 1987), and
unilateral tariffs can induce a home market effect in the presence of transportation costs
(Helpman and Krugman, 1989). Furthermore, similar situations occur in Brander-Spencer-
type settings.
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Tariffs versus icebergs
The above finding of welfare increasing small bilateral tariffs, has been de-
rived under an explicit model of tariffs including the re-distribution of tariff
revenues. In this respect our approach departs from the customary iceberg
costs specifications, but is more suited to examine actual tariff liberaliza-
tion effects instead of effects from improved transport technologies (reduced
iceberg costs). Ceteris paribus improved transport technology will be wel-
fare improving irrespective of the impact on trade patterns. The question
than remains is, if the established welfare effect of the present paper is solely
driven by this modelling difference of redistributed revenues. The answer
is no. A simple way to introduce an iceberg type setting is to let tariff
revenues be wasted. In particular, we assume that the state uses all tariff
earnings and entry fees em to purchase goods following the consumption pat-
tern of consumers, but subsequently throws out these goods. Accordingly,
the m,nt, nd, xd and xz derived above still apply, and consumers – in line
with iceberg cost settings – still have access to the full range of variety. The
only revision in our welfare expression then becomes that consumers only
consume a share (proportional to the share of wages in total earnings) of
each good. In particular the consumers’ share, scaling down the cd, ct and cf
in (2), is I = L
L+τpzntxz+(1−δ)fm . Estimating the revised utility expression UI ,
and finding the derivative with respect to τ at τ = 0 in the limit of θ → 0
gives
∂UI
∂τ
|τ=0,θ→0 = fLγ(
√
αγ(2f + 3αγ)− αγ)(1− δ)√
αγ(2f + 3αγ)(f + 3αγ −√αγ(2f + 3αγ) + fδ)2 > 0 ,
(17)
and in the limit of θ → 1 it becomes
∂UI
∂τ
|τ=0,θ→1 = − 2(f + 2αγ −
√
αγ(2f + 3αγ))
βh(2f + 3αγ −
√
αγ(2f + 3αγ))
< 0 . (18)
Thus, for sufficiently strong consumer preferences for variety, small bilat-
eral “wasted” tariffs can increase welfare by expelling high fixed export cost
firms from the market, i.e. replicating the result established in Proposition
1. However, with sufficiently low love of variety the “waste” aspect in iceberg
tariffs dominates and welfare is maximized at τ = 0.15
15A related observation occurs for the initial sunk entry costs. In the iceberg-like case,
where the entry lottery fee would consists exclusively of labour costs (the here excluded
case of δ = 1), welfare would be maximized at τ = 0.
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the welfare impact of trade policy in an intra-industry
trade model with firm-level heterogeneity. This new type of specifications,
where firms are heterogeneous with respect to their cost structures, has gen-
erated important new insights, frequently reconciling theory with the stylized
facts of international trade, e.g. Schmitt and Yu (2001), Montagna (2001),
Melitz (2003), but has not yet been used to examine trade policies system-
atically.
Our model examines bilateral ad valorem tariffs in a symmetric two-
country intra-industry trade model, with firm-level heterogeneous fixed costs
of exporting. The focus on fixed cost heterogeneity – instead of marginal cost
heterogeneity – is justified both on empirical grounds and by the simplicity
of the resulting model. In particular, since all firms charge the same price,
straight forward analytical solutions can be provided throughout the paper.
Still, fixed costs heterogeneity has previously received less attention. Our
model traces many of the stylized facts of international trade well. However,
we find that in this model there is in fact too much trade in the free trade
equilibrium. More resources are used on the exporting/importing activity
than is welfare-optimal, measured as total consumer utility. There exists a
strictly positive bilateral tariff that maximizes national and world welfare.
Accordingly, trade liberalization, in particular the reciprocal reduction of
small tariffs, is welfare-reducing. The underlying mechanism for our result
is that even though small bilateral tariffs reduce the number of traded vari-
eties, the number of available varieties in both countries is maintained and
consumption volumes of home products increase. This mechanism is at work
even though the fixed costs of creating a new domestic variety are always
larger than the firm-specific fixed costs of exporting and even though there
are no wasteful transport costs. In particular our finding is in contrast to
Melitz (2003), and subsequent work, who examines iceberg trade cost reduc-
tions in a setting where firms are heterogeneous in their marginal costs. Yet,
also when iceberg like costs are introduced into the present framework, small
bilateral “wasted” tariffs can be welfare improving.
Going beyond the specific model presented here, the present paper hopes
to have shown that the application of more realistic and powerful specifica-
tions for the workhorse model of intra-industry trade does not only answer
many of the conflicts between stylized facts and theory, it also raises impor-
tant new issues. Future research should address the welfare effects of trade
policies for different forms of firm-level heterogeneity and for more types of
trade barriers.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivative of ∂a¯h∂τ
From (14) we have a¯h =
(√
α2 + 2α(f
γ
+ α)(1− τ) 21−θ − α
)
(1 − τ) 1θ−1 . It
follows immediately that:
∂a¯h
∂τ
= −
α
(√
α(α + 2(f
γ
+ α)(1− τ) 21−θ )− α
)
(1− τ) 2−θθ−1
(1− θ)
√
α
(
α+ 2(f
γ
+ α)(1− τ) 21−θ
) < 0. (A.1)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Total consumer utility under free trade exceeds that under autarky; in
particular, U |τ=0 > U |autarky.
Evaluating (16) at τ = 0 gives:
U |τ=0 = L(1− θ)
α
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
(√
α(2 f
γ
+3α)−α θ
Lβh(1−θ)
)θ
3α−
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α) + f
γ
(δ + θ(1− δ) + 1)
(A.2)
Under autarky (where the tariff is prohibitive and accordingly a¯h = 0) we
have xd|autarky = θ(α+
f
γ
)
(1−θ)βh and accordingly m|autarky =
L(1−θ)
αγ+f(δ+θ(1−δ)) . Setting
in these values, total utility under autarky is given by:
U |autarky =
L(1− θ)
(
( f
γ
+α)θ
Lβh(1−θ)
)θ
α+ f
γ
(δ + θ(1− δ)) (A.3)
Hence, we want to show that for all α > 0, 0 < f < αγ
2
, θ ∈ [0, 1], δ ∈]0, 1[:√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
(√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α) − α
)θ
α
(
3α−
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α) + f
γ
(δ + θ(1− δ) + 1)
) >
(
f
γ
+ α
)θ
α+ f
γ
(δ + θ(1− δ))
(A.4)
Step 1: Define s = f
γα
⇔ f = γαs and insert in (A.4), which leads to:
√
2s+ 3
(√
2s+ 3 − 1)θ
s+ 3−√2s+ 3 + s(δ + θ(1− δ)) >
(s+ 1)θ
1 + s(δ + θ(1− δ)) (A.5)
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Step 2: Define v =
√
2s+ 3 ⇔ s = v2−3
2
. As 0 < f < αγ
2
and s = f
γα
we
have that
√
3 < v <
√
4. By substituting for s in (A.5) we get:
v2θ (v − 1)θ
v2 + 3− 2v + (v2 − 3)(δ + θ(1− δ)) >
(v2 − 1)θ
(v2 − 3)(δ + θ(1− δ)) + 2 (A.6)
Note, that (v2 − 1)θ = (v + 1)θ (v − 1)θ. Since v > √3 > 1, we have that
(v − 1)θ > 0 and (A.6) leads to:
v2θ
v2 + 3− 2v + (v2 − 3)(δ + θ(1− δ)) >
(v + 1)θ
(v2 − 3)(δ + θ(1− δ)) + 2 (A.7)
m
v
(
v2 − 3) (δ + θ(1− δ)) + 2v >(
v + 1
2
)θ (
v2 − 3) (δ + θ(1− δ)) + (v + 1
2
)θ (
v2 − 2v + 3) (A.8)
Step 3: Define LHS(θ) = v (v2 − 3) (δ + θ(1 − δ)) + 2v = v(2 + (v2 −
3)δ) + v(v2 − 3)(1 − δ)θ and RHS(θ) = (v+1
2
)θ
(v2 − 3) (δ + θ(1 − δ)) +(
v+1
2
)θ
(v2 − 2v + 3) = (v+1
2
)θ
((v2 − 3)δ + v2 − 2v + 3)+ (v+1
2
)θ
(v2− 3)(1−
δ)θ. LHS(θ) is linear in θ with a slope and an intercept that depend on v.
Furthermore, LHS(0) = 2v + vδ(v2 − 3) and LHS(1) = v3 − v. RHS(θ)
looks linear in θ but it is multiplied with the factor
(
v+1
2
)θ
. It is evident
that RHS(0) = v2 − 2v + 3 + (v2 − 3)δ and that RHS(1) = v3 − v. Hence,
LHS(1) = RHS(1).
Now we want to show that LHS(0) > RHS(0) for all relevant v. It is
true since, LHS(0) > RHS(0)⇔ 2v+v(v2−3)δ > (v2−3)δ+v2−2v+3⇔
(1− v)(v − 3) + (v − 1)(v2 − 3)δ > 0 and √3 < v < √4.
Step 4: We want to show that RHS(θ) is convex in θ where θ ∈ [o, 1] and√
3 < v <
√
4. Differentiating RHS(θ) with respect to θ we get:
RHS ′(θ) =
(
v2 − 3) (1− δ)(θ(v + 1
2
)θ
ln
(
v + 1
2
)
+
(
v + 1
2
)θ)
+
(
(v2 − 3)δ + v2 − 2v + 3)(v + 1
2
)θ
ln
(
v + 1
2
)
(A.9)
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From (A.9) it follows that:
RHS ′′(θ)
=
(
v2 − 3) (1− δ)(ln(v + 1
2
) (
θ
(
v + 1
2
)θ
ln
(
v + 1
2
)
+
(
v + 1
2
)θ))
+
(
v2 − 3) (1− δ)((v + 1
2
)θ
ln
(
v + 1
2
))
+
(
(v2 − 3)δ + v2 − 2v + 3) ln(v + 1
2
)(
v + 1
2
)θ
ln
(
v + 1
2
)
(A.10)
From (A.10) it follows that RHS ′′(θ) > 0 for all
√
3 < v <
√
4, θ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, RHS(θ) is convex, and therefor LHS(θ) > RHS(θ). We have now
shown that U |τ=0 > U |autarky.
Proof. There exists a strictly positive bilateral tariff that maximizes total na-
tional and world consumer utility; in particular ∂U
∂τ
|τ=0 > 0. By differen-
tiation (16) with respect to τ and evaluating the expression in τ = 0 we
get:
∂U
∂τ
|τ=0 =
2fLα
(
f
γ
+ 2α−
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
)
(1− θ)
(√
α(2 f
γ
+3α)−α θ
Lβh(1−θ)
)θ
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
(√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)− α
) (
f
γ
(1 + δ + θ(1− δ)) + 3α−
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
)2
(A.11)
(A.11) is positive as:
f
γ
+ 2α >
√
α(2
f
γ
+ 3α)
⇓
f 2 + α2γ2 + 2fαγ > 0
A.3 Proof of ∂n˜∂τ |τ=0 > 0 .
Proof. The number of available varieties increases for a small tariff. The
number of varieties available on the home market is given by n˜ = n + nf .
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From (15) and using the fact that nt = n
∗
t = nf = F (a¯)n it follows that
n˜ =
L(1− θ)
α
α− α(1− τ) 1θ−1 +
√
α(α+ 2(f
γ
+ α) (1− τ) 21−θ ) (1− τ) 1θ−1
f
γ
(1 + δ + θ(1− δ)) + α(2 + (1− τ) 2θ−1 )−
√
α(α+ 2(f
γ
+ α)(1− τ) 21−θ ) (1− τ) 2θ−1
(A.12)
The derivative of n˜ in (A.12) with respect to τ , and evaluated at the free
trade situation, τ = 0, gives:
∂n˜
∂τ
|τ=0 =
L(1− θ)f
γ
(√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α) − α
)
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
(
f
γ
(1 + δ + θ(1− δ)) + 3α−
√
α(2f
γ
+ 3α)
)2 > 0.
(A.13)
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A.4 The number of firms and available varieties
Figure A.1 plots the number of firms, m, the number of pure domestic pro-
ducers, ndh , and exporting producers, nth , and the total number of available
varieties, n˜h, as a function of τ . Other parameter values are α = 3, βh = 0.5,
θ = 0.4, f = 1, L = 1000, γ = 0.9, δ = 0.3.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Τ
50
100
150
n˜h
m
ndh
nth
Figure A.1: Number of firms and available varieties
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A.5 Production scale
Figure A.2 plots the production scale, xdh , that is sold by domestic non-
exporting and exporting firms on the domestic market, and the production
scale, xzh , sold by foreign exporters on the domestic market (which is identical
to the sales that domestic exporters have on the foreign market). Other
parameter values are α = 3, βh = 0.5, θ = 0.4, f = 1, L = 1000, γ = 0.9,
δ = 0.3.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Τ
2
4
6
8 xdh
xzh
Figure A.2: Output (production scale)
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